Discrimination based on place of residence and access to employment by Bunel, Mathieu et al.
Discrimination based on place of residence and access to
employment
Mathieu Bunel, Yannick L’Horty, Pascale Petit
To cite this version:
Mathieu Bunel, Yannick L’Horty, Pascale Petit. Discrimination based on place of residence
and access to employment. 2014. <halshs-01100287>
HAL Id: halshs-01100287
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01100287
Submitted on 6 Jan 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
              WORKING PAPER 
 
N° 2014 - 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discrimination based on place of residence and 
access to employment 
             
 
MATHIEU BUNEL, YANNICK L’HORTY, PASCALE PETIT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.tepp.eu 
 
TEPP - Institute for Labor Studies and Public Policies 
TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - FR CNRS 3435 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2110-5472 
 1 
Discrimination based on place of residence 
and access to employment 
 
 
Mathieu Bunel 
Université de Bourgogne –Laboratoire d’économie de Dijon (UMR 6307 CNRS) 
Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques (TEPP) CNRS : FR3435 
  
Yannick L'Horty 
Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée (UPEMLV) 
Equipe de Recherche sur l'Utilisation des Données Individuelles Temporelles en Economie (ERUDITE) 
Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques (TEPP) CNRS : FR3435 
 
 Pascale Petit 
Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée (UPEMLV) 
Equipe de Recherche sur l'Utilisation des Données Individuelles Temporelles en Economie (ERUDITE) 
Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques (TEPP) CNRS : FR3435 
 
Version : juin 2014 
  
 2 
 
 
There are huge local disparities in the unemployment rates across metropolitan areas in Europe 
as well as in the United States. Many explanations for these disparities have been given in the 
urban economics literature, including skill mismatches among the residents, physical distances 
to the job, and local social networks. In the present paper we explore the role of hiring 
discrimination based on the reputation of the place of residence of the applicant. We use the 
field experiment methodology of correspondence testing to study the impact of a poor 
neighbourhood reputation on French young job seekers in accessing employment in the 
metropolitan Paris region.1 
In all previous papers dealing with employment discrimination based on the place of residence, 
and more generally in the literature on neighbourhood effects, the definition of the boundaries 
and the scope of the neighbourhood are rarely considered. 2  It is most often based on a single 
level administrative definition (Duguet et al., 2010) or on a statistical index (Tunstall, 2014).  
Nonetheless, the measure employed for a place of residence effect may vary a priori according 
to the boundaries, and therefore it is interesting to consider higher or lower levels of 
aggregation.  It is also useful to investigate whether the effect of the neighbourhood can be 
sensitive to its urban context. Our methodology allows us to verify whether a disadvantaged 
place of residence, which is officially labelled (in the French context) as a geographical priority 
area, has the same effects if that area is located in a more advantaged locality or a less 
advantaged one. 
This study’s novelty lies in the experimental measuring of place of residence effects derived 
from a multi-level protocol that allows one to discern the effects at different levels of spatial 
aggregation: large administrative units (the "département" in France), municipalities, and 
neighbourhoods. This protocol was applied to two administrative units (Seine-Saint-Denis and 
                                                 
1 A poor neighborhood has a high concentration of low-income residents who are considered to be 
disadvantaged. In France many such neighborhoods are officially designated as zones urbaines sensibles (sensitive 
urban zones) (ZUS hereafter). 
2 Beyond the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) that is well-known to geographers, the boundaries of the 
neighbourhood are not well documented. According to the principle of Suttle (1972), the definition of one’s 
neighborhood has a multi-dimensional nature, while Galster (2001) shows that the representations of the limits are 
not stable and vary according to the daily activities performed by individuals (i.e. consumption, transportation, ...). 
 3 
the city of Paris) in the Paris region, which are geographically close but quite different in terms 
of socio-economic status, in order to compare the effects associated with three types of 
neighbourhoods:  favoured areas, intermediate reputation areas, and disadvantaged areas. 
The study is organized as follows. We provide a survey of the literature of the place of residence 
effect in the context of hiring discrimination in Section 2. Section 3 describes the protocol that 
was used to build the database.  The fourth and fifth sections present the results and describe 
the econometric methods.  We discuss our results in the final section.   
2. Place of residence effect in Labour Markets 
Four broad categories of explanations have been developed in the literature to explain 
unemployment local rate disparities: skill mismatches, spatial mismatches, neighbourhood 
social effects, and postal code discrimination. We focus mainly on the last of them, but it is 
useful to give a short description of the others. 
First, the skill mismatch hypothesis highlights a mismatch between the (typically low) skills of 
the unemployed and the (typically high) skills demanded by local employers. Because of 
residential sorting, low-skilled people are concentrated in low-income and low-rent suburbs in 
Europe (but tend to be concentrated in core urban areas in the US). In Paris area, according to 
Gobillon et al. (2011), the skill mismatch hypothesis explains a small part of intra-urban 
unemployment rate heterogeneity.3 
Second, the physical distance between the place of residence and the available jobs complicates 
the job search process and decreases the chances of leaving unemployment. This is to the so-
called ‘spatial mismatch’ hypothesis (Kain, 1968). An unemployed worker who resides far 
away from job centers will experience longer and more costly job search (Rogers, 1997; 
Immergluk 1998; Wasmer and Zenou, 2002). Potential employers will prefer an employee 
whose place of residence is closer because he/she will be able to exert a level of greater effort 
at his work (Zenou, 2002). He/she runs the risk of tardiness or absenteeism and might generally 
be less flexible in his/her scheduling (van Ommeren et al., 2011). Finally, employers can 
internalize the phenomenon whereby travelling long distances reduces the worker’s utility 
                                                 
3. Gobillon et al. (2011) using administrative data from Paris area pointed out that only 30% of the 
unemployment survival rates are related to individual variables. 
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levels associated with employment at the firm for a given wage. As the most distant employees 
may have a relatively high quit rate, companies that employ them are less likely to maximize 
their profit (Sattinger, 1998). 
Third, the socio-demographic composition of the labour force of the area affects the chances of 
accessing employment through neighbourhood, peer, or social networks effects, all three of 
which play a major role in the search for employment (see Galster, 2010, Ioannides et al., 2004, 
Hellerstein et al., 2014). Furthermore, the presence of local amenities, and notably the incidence 
of public sector employment and subsidised employment, influence the employment and 
unemployment dynamics of the localities.  
Finally, employers can have particular preferences for workers from a certain locality and use 
the address as a screening criteria (McGregor, 1977; Tilly et al., 2001; Zenou, 2002). Many 
surveys seem to confirm the existence of this phenomenon of postal code discrimination. 
According to Atkinson et al. (2001), in response to the question "Is there anything about living 
in this area which makes getting a job more difficult?", between one-third and one-quarter of 
the residents of deprived areas in Scotland responded that the reputation of the area is 
problematic. In France, 19% of job seekers located in the zone urbaine sensible (ZUS) report 
that their localisation makes getting a job more difficult (ONZUS, 2012).4 
Theoretically this territorial preference can be explained by statistical discrimination (Phelps, 
1972; Fang and Moro, 2011) driven by the preferences of the employer, employees, or 
consumers. In this case, the place of residence plays a role of signaling productive and non-
productive characteristics of its inhabitants. Based on 250 face-to-face interviews in the US, 
Tilly et al., (2001) confirmed that employers use their own mental map in order to predict a 
worker’s characteristics on the basis of their place of residence. They concluded that this place 
is strongly interrelated with race as well as worker’s skills and attitudes as perceived by 
employers. 
A lot of papers attempt to explain the effect of residential segregation or spatial mismatch on 
the unemployment rate or on unemployment duration (Galster, 2010; Ioannides et al., 2004; 
Hellerstein et al., 2013). However surprisingly few papers attempt to measure the level of 
                                                 
4 According a recent survey carried out in 2013, two-thirds of the inhabitants of ZUS say that living in such area 
make harder searching to work 2/3 (IFOP, 2013). Tunstall et al. (2014) present different qualitative studies that 
conclude that such a phenomenon exist in the UK. 
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residential stigmatisation on labor outcome’s. In UK, McGregor (1977) used a survey of 900 
unemployed men job seekers living in Paisley area in the south-west of Glasgow (Scotland) to 
examine the neighbourhood reputation effect on unemployment duration. Estimating a linear 
model with the least squares technique5 based on a sub-sample of job seekers with completed 
spells of unemployment and controlling for observed individual’s characteristics, he found that 
residing in a poor reputation neighbourhood (in this case Ferguslie Park) hugely increases (by 
around 45%) the average unemployment duration. 
A French study conducted in 2008 used the “Trajectories and Origins” survey seems to confirm 
this result (ONZUS, 2012). Implementing the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition procedure on the 
probability of access to employment, the authors of this study found that two-thirds of the gap 
between deprived areas and control areas cannot be explained by individual characteristics, and 
thus are attributable to a location effect. However, such results based on surveys are not fully 
convincing, because stigmatization of workers on the basis of the reputation of their 
neighbourhood is what Manski (1993) called a correlated effect. This empirical challenge is 
inherent in many strictly cross-sectional regressions. By using survey data, it is quite difficult 
to identify such effects due to the presence of other endogenous or exogenous omitted effects.  
To address this problem, recent papers propose a new methodology to measure spatial 
discrimination based on the field experiment of “Correspondence Testing”. This method allows 
one to compare, all other things being equal, the access rates to employment opportunities of 
fictitious candidates who are similar by design in all respects (i.e. the content of their 
application) except for the characteristic whose impact is the focus of the test (Riach and Rich, 
2002). It allows one to measure an effect specific to the place of residence independently from 
other channels which are frequently advanced in the literature pertaining to a localisation effect 
(e.g. skill mismatches of the residents, physical distance to the job, local social network). 
This type of experimental approach has already been successfully implemented in order to 
measure the interacted effects of the place of residence, gender, and ethnic origin on the chances 
of being called in for an interview in the United-States by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) 
and in France by Duguet et al. (2010), L’Horty et al. (2012) and Petit et al. (2014).6 
                                                 
5 Note that this specification and estimation technique does not take into account the distribution of duration 
times nor the censoring processes.  
6 Bonnet et al. (2014) test the impact of place of residence in the housing market by using correspondence testing 
in Paris area (France). 
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Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) compared job access outcomes for young whites and blacks 
living in advantaged and disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the cities of Boston and Chicago. 
They found that living in a privileged neighbourhood increased the probabilities of employer's 
calling back applicants for administrative and sales jobs by 5.4 percentage points for all 
candidates (with no significant differences between races). 
Duguet et al. (2010) studied the chances of obtaining a job interview for 140 posted job 
vacancies for accountants located in Paris area for 16 variations of fictitious candidates who 
differed by their nationality, origin, surname and given name, and reputation of place of 
residence. All candidates were young males. They found no significant effect for the place of 
residence’s reputation at the municipal level. Petit et al. (2014) replicate the same kind of study 
in the Paris area for 117 actual job openings for waiters using 16 candidates as well. The 
selected privileged or underprivileged town where candidates are located are situated at equal 
distance to the core of Paris. They estimated a degree of postal code discrimination to the tune 
of 4.5 percentage points. L’Horty et al. (2012) carried out another correspondence testing 
experiment in the Paris region for computer scientists and found that the people most affected 
by hiring discrimination based on the reputation of the place of residence were women of French 
origin. 
More recently, Tunstall et al. (2014), based on 2010 data), tested for the presence of 
discrimination within several occupations (office administration, cleaner, security guard, sales 
assistant, accounts clerk, kitchen hand and chefs) in three local labor markets in the UK that 
differ by their unemployment rates. They measure hiring discrimination based on gender and 
based on two places of residence that differ by their reputation (“bland” and “poor”). Among 
192 ads that elicited at least one positive answer from an employer, they show that applicants 
who reside in a poor reputation neighbourhood have 2.6 percentage points lower probability to 
be invited to an interview by the employer than applicants from the bland reputation 
neighbourhood. According to the authors, this postal code discrimination is not significant at 
the 10% level, but it is at the 15% level. They mentioned that "It remains possible that, in a 
larger correspondence test study, the net preferences found would achieve statistical 
significance". Moreover, by using simulation methods like bootstrapping for standard errors 
instead of a parametric test, they could have reached a different conclusion for their inferences 
(Duguet et al., 2010). 
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The present paper follows the same path. Its aim is to investigate the effect of the place of 
residence‘s reputation on employment access at different spatial levels. In ascending order of 
aggregation, they are the neighbourhood, municipality, and the larger administrative unit.  
 
The Field Experiment’s Design 
In this paper we used the "correspondence testing" field experiment method. The procedure 
consisted of sending over 2,988 applications in response to a sample of 498 real job offers that 
were posted between October 2011 and February 2012 in the catering industry. Our testing 
procedure consists of drafting from scratch six fictitious résumés which are perfectly identical 
in terms of qualifications and career paths. We now present our experimental protocol in greater 
details. 
If one seeks to evaluate the extent of employment discrimination related to the place of 
residence, one requires a comparison of access to employment of individuals who are similar 
in all respects except for the location of their residence.  This involves comparing the apparent 
chances of hiring of two candidates for which the only difference between them is their place 
of residence. These candidates must therefore share all the individual characteristics (e.g. sex, 
origin, age, marital status, mobility, hobbies), the same human capital (e.g. degrees, experience, 
technical and language skills), exert the same job search efforts, display the same level of 
motivation and apply to the same type of vacancies for the same positions at the same time. At 
this early stage of the recruitment process, involving only applications and call-backs, we hold 
the level of motivation and the level of job search fixed by sending resumes simultaneously in 
response to the same job offers at the same companies. Our measure of access to employment 
is therefore the discrete and observable event of whether or not the applicant received a call-
back for an interview. 
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Six Locations 
The places of residence of the six fictitious candidates are selected in order to measure three 
distinct effects that are nested or embedded within each other, on the access to employment, all 
other things being equal: the effect of the reputation of the large administrative unit of residence, 
of the municipality, and of the neighbourhood. We focus on two of the eight large 
administrative units in the Greater Paris area (these units correspond to a “département” in the 
French administrative division) which are geographically close to each other but are quite 
economically and socially differentiated: Paris7 and Seine-Saint-Denis8 (see table 1). The latter 
has a lower average standard of living of their residents (in 2006 the median income is €10,000 
lower than in Paris), a higher share of inhabitants living in zone urbaine sensible (ZUS) (20% 
versus 6%), and a higher job seeking rate (16.9% versus 11% in 2009).  
Insert Map 1 here 
 
Within these two geographical units, we have chosen three actual addresses located in 
neighbourhoods having very distinct reputations but situated in close proximity to each other. 
This proximity facilitates the measurement of the neighbourhood effects for a given travelling 
distance to work. The first set of three fictitious candidates resides in the North of Paris in the 
18th district. They are distinguished by the reputation of their neighbourhood, which is 
identified by the street where they reside (see Map 1). One of the candidates resides in an area 
which is considered to be advantaged (place du Tertre). Another lives in a disadvantaged 
neighbourhood known and classified as a ZUS. The third candidate is located in an area having 
an intermediate reputation (rue Championnet). 
The second set of three fictional candidates resides in the center of Seine-Saint-Denis. Two 
of them live in the same municipality (the city of Bondy): one of them in a neighbourhood that 
is classified as ZUS, and the other one is an area of intermediate reputation. The third candidate 
                                                 
7 Paris is both a department (75) and a municipality, a configuration which is unique in France. 
8
The other six units in the greater Paris area are Hauts-de-Seine (92), Val-de-Marne (94), Essonne (91), Yvelines 
(78), Seine-et-Marne (77), and Val d'Oise (95). 
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lives in another municipality called Le Raincy with a bland reputation. Table 1 presents 
statistics for these neighbourhoods.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Choice of two occupations present in tight labour markets: waiters and cooks in restaurants 
The methodology of testing is particularly costly to implement. Among all occupations, we have 
chosen jobs in the restaurant industry (cooks and waiters) because restaurants are spatially widely 
dispersed in Ile-de-France and because such occupations are characterised by relatively tight 
labour markets. 9 
Insert Map 1 here 
By selecting an occupation with a high number of job seekers, one lowers the probability of 
recruiters detecting a suspicious job application when a large number of resumes are sent 
simultaneously. By selecting an occupation characterized by tightness in the labour market, one 
limits the number of refusals from employers with or without discriminatory behaviour. This 
methodological precaution proved to be particularly useful in the context of an economic recession 
during which our datas are collected. Nevertheless, the flipside of somewhat high success rates of 
applicants in an occupation with a tight labour market in terms of discrimination is that the call-
back process becomes less selective, and it is therefore more difficult to observe discrimination in 
hiring under these conditions. 
 
  
                                                 
9According to data drawn from the historic data file of the French unemployment agency (Pôle Emploi), the 
"kitchen staff" occupations in Ile-de-France include both a large number of job applications (5,529 job applications 
a year from March 2009 to March 2010) completed with a significant number of job offers (13,164 during that 
same period). The tightness rate for this occupation (the number of job offers recorded in one month of a year 
divided by the number of job applications per year) is high (0.62) relative to other professions or occupations. 
These same statistics for the occupation of waiters in restaurants are 5,622 job applications and 8,875 job offers, 
respectively, for a tightness rate of 0.48. For the purposes of comparison, the figures for masonry in Ile-de-France 
over the same period are 4,075 job applications and 2,371 job offers, for a tightness rate of 0.26. 
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As the location of our candidates is listed in his/her application, we assert that the dispersion in 
distances from homes to workplaces will be sufficient to evaluate the effect of residence regardless 
of commuting time between residences and workplaces. Note that the two occupations selected, 
namely cooks and waiters, are characterized in particular by their face-to-face exposure to 
customers, which may play a role in discrimination in hiring (Neumark et al., 1996; Bouvard and 
al., 2009). For each of these two occupations, two skill levels were examined, namely medium-
skilled and low-skilled. 
 
Similar fictitious candidates 
The applications that were sent in response to the same job offers are identical in terms of 
productive characteristics and individual characteristics other than the one for which the effect is 
subjected to testing, namely the place of residence. In particular, these applications are similar with 
respect to educational background, career path, and job experience in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms. These applications will appear as normal to the targeted occupations, as they 
were vetted and validated by professionals with experience working in the industry before being 
submitted. This expertise ensures that applications are similar, realistic, and relevant for this very 
particular labour market. 
The six fictitious candidates are French, and the sound of their surnames and given names does 
not suggest that they are first or second-generation immigrants. They are all males, and their given 
first names are among the most common in France. Their given names indicate their gender and 
are also most common for their year of birth. The six medium-skilled candidates are 27 years old, 
and the low-skilled ones are 22 years old. All candidates display on their job applications that they 
are single, without children, hold a driver’s license, and have a car. 
These six candidates all followed the same training path. The low-skilled ones received in 2007 
a Professional Aptitude Certificate (CAP), that is a vocational certification inferior to a high school 
diploma. The medium-skilled ones hold a professional high school diploma specialised in a 
profession (BAC-PRO) validated in 2004. These precise qualifications have been obtained in the 
framework of an apprenticeship (two years for a CAP and four years for BAC-PRO).  
Since leaving the education and training system, the six most qualified candidates that are cooks 
or waiters have accumulated seven and a half years of experience working in three different 
restaurants. It is mentioned in their job application that one of the restaurants where the candidate 
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has worked was a gourmet type, and the other two restaurants were the traditional type. The six 
less-qualified candidates worked in three different restaurants, all of which are of the traditional 
type, since receiving their diploma four and a half years ago. None of the candidates has reported 
a prior period of unemployment: they were all currently employed when they applied for the job. 
In total, we have drafted a total of 24 fictitious applications (consisting of a résumé and cover 
letters): six duplicate profiles for two occupations (cooks and waiters) for two levels of 
qualification (skilled and less skilled). 
 
Marginal differentiation and the permutations for job applications 
Since the applications were sent in response to the same job offers, they had to include some 
elements of differentiation. These differences relate to the presentation of the resumes while 
remaining standard in terms of format, i.e. the type of font, font size, layout of the page, etc. There 
are also no photographs of the candidates on their written applications. 
The candidates’ experiences refer to actual companies which are different yet comparable (in 
terms of service line and size). They all received their degree(s) and began their careers outside of 
Ile-de-France in different cities, but they have lived and worked in the Ile-de-France region for 
more than a year. The candidates’ recreational activities and hobbies are also different, but they 
not appear to be excessively original or esoteric (sport, cinema, reading, music, etc...).The brief 
cover letters accompanying the CVs were also formulated differently without being too unique. A 
postal address, or cell phone number and an email address have been assigned to each candidate. 
To avoid having the style or content of a particular application systematically influencing the 
employer's selection for a particular candidate (and this risk might be present despite the 
precautions taken during the drafting of the application), we have developed a system of random 
rotations between the CVs of the identities of the fictitious candidates. The sources for the listings 
of job offers were alternated between the candidates throughout the job search process. 
Collection of job offers and field testing 
Centralized websites from French employment agency (“Pole Emploi”) and from “L’Hôtellerie-
Restauration”, that list most of the employment opportunities in the catering sector were consulted 
daily in order to compile job offers from mid-October 2011 to early February 2012. We sent 
applications to all offers that are relevant for the study that were available on the two websites, 
insofar as the employer allowed a contact by either regular post or by email. 
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All job offers for waiters or cooks requiring a CAP or a professional high school diploma, with 
either fixed-term or permanent contracts, and located in Ile-de-France, fall within the scope of the 
study. A total of 498 job offers from separate restaurants were subjected to testing: 253 job offers 
for cooks and 245 job offers for waiters. This corresponds to sending a total of 2,988 applications 
(6  498). 
We modelled the outcome of obtaining a job interview. In the event of a positive response, 
however, no candidate was sent subsequently to an interview for the following two reasons related 
to our methodology. First, physically sending candidates for interviews would introduce a bias due 
to the subjective judgment by recruiters with respect to the appearance, behaviour, or personality 
of candidates. As this inevitable bias is unobservable to researchers and cannot be controlled for, 
it would generate a flawed measure of discrimination in hiring. We believe that as long as the 
organizing and arranging of interviews generates a cost to the recruiter, he/she will only convoke 
candidates who actually have a fair chance of obtaining the job. We therefore assume that 
discriminatory behaviour on the part of employers occurs primarily during the selection of written 
applications of candidates who are granted an interview (for which the potentially discriminating 
factor is the place of residence explicitly appearing on the resume, as explained above). 
Applications in response to the same job offer were usually sent on the day of the release of the 
offer by e-mail from the mailbox of each candidate, or by the post. In the latter case, applications 
were mailed from various post offices in Ile-de-France in order to reduce the risk of detecting 
patterns in our testing procedures. 
 
3. Descriptive Statistics on Success Rates 
We first present descriptive statistics generated from our experiment. The response is 
considered to be positive when the recruiter invites the applicant to an interview, or if he/she 
conveys interest in obtaining more information regarding the candidate or his qualifications. 
However, the response is considered negative if the recruiter formally refuses the application, 
or if there is no reply. 
Success rates by place of residence of the candidate 
Overall, 192 job offers out of 498 (38.5%) that were subjected to testing led to a positive 
response for at least one of the six fictitious candidates. This positive response rate is slightly 
higher for cooks (41.9%) than for waiters (35.1%), reflecting a looser labour market in the case 
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of the latter. This finding is consistent with what was reported in the survey data contained in 
The Labour Force Needs, conducted by French employment agency, in which employers in the 
catering sector reported having greater difficulty in recruiting cooks (45% in Paris and 59% in 
Seine-Saint-Denis) than waiters (38% in Paris, 25% in Seine-Saint-Denis). We also note that 
success rates are lower for the low-skilled qualification profiles (31.7%) than for the medium-
skilled ones (48.3%).  
Tables 2 and 3 show the results in terms of gross success rates cross-tabulated for each type 
of candidate and in terms of pair-wise differences in success rates. In Table 2, we compute the 
direct and joint effects of the reputation of the area of residence, at the large administrative unit 
level and at the neighbourhood level. In Table 3, we present these results broken down by 
occupation and skill levels. Estimated standard deviations and confidence intervals are obtained 
by using the cluster-bootstrapping technique with 10,000 draws.10  
The first part of the tables 2 and 3 lists the estimates of the joint effects of the large 
administrative unit’s reputation (Seine-Saint Denis versus Paris) and the neighbourhood 
reputation (disadvantaged versus advantaged). We highlight this estimate because it is the most 
marked disparity among several other cases. The effect is significant and large (around 9.4 
percentage points, third row in Table 2). We discern a similar result for all of the profiles of 
candidates, albeit with differences among them. Between waiters and cooks, disparity is almost 
doubled (see Table 3). One possible interpretation of this result is that the market for cooks is 
a bit tighter, which makes discriminatory behaviour more costly for employers. An alternative 
interpretation is that waiters work in face-to-face contact with customers, which can potentially 
generate an additional source of discrimination. A server requires strong interpersonal 
communication skills. Employers could exert prejudice by believing that living in a poorer area 
could be associated with lower expressive and communication skills of candidates. 
Discrimination related to the place of residence against waiters would be a case of statistical 
discrimination evoked by Arrow. This interpretation is consistent with the results of an earlier 
study derived from French data, which indicated that discrimination is more pronounced in 
France for professions and occupations that interact with the customers (Duguet et al., 2010, 
Petit et al., 2013).  
                                                 
10 Cluster-bootstrap is based on drawing with replacement the cluster units (the offers) instead of observations. 
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Tables 2 and 3 show also the specific effects of residing in large disadvantaged administrative 
units as well as the effects associated with neighbourhood and municipality reputation. We 
found that only the two first effects are significant. Moreover, the effect of residing in a large 
deprived administrative unit (Table 2: - 7.7 %) is larger than the neighbourhood effect (-2.8 %). 
The neighbourhood effect is significant only among the inhabitants of Paris. We find no 
significant neighbourhood effect for inhabitants of Seine-Saint-Denis (bottom row, Table 2).  
We now turn to our measures of discrimination broken down by occupation and skill level. 
The results are pretty similar compared to the global pattern with two exceptions. First, the 
effect of residing in a large disadvantaged administrative area is not any more significant for 
the low-skilled cooks. An interpretation for this finding is that we might not have enough 
observations to be able to discern this effect. Secondly, for higher-skilled workers, whether they 
be cooks or waiters, we do not find any more significant neighbourhood effects within Paris. 
This could be due to a lack of observations as well as tightness of the labor market for that level 
of skill, factors which do not facilitate discriminations by the employers. 
We also conduct a more formal test for the existence of discrimination by carrying out a 
binomial test whose null hypothesis is that no group is preferred over another (see Duguet et 
al., 2010 for a presentation). Results are very close to those contained in tables 2 and 3. 11 
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Controlling for the distance effects of the location of restaurants 
This first set of results is quite interesting, but it also seems worthwhile to distinguish between 
the location of restaurants as opposed to solely the location of the candidates. In this vein, we 
compute the distance between the locations of candidates and restaurants. We have chosen 
addresses for the three Parisian candidates that are close to each other as well as for the three 
candidates residing in Seine-Saint-Denis (distances less than 2km; see Map 1). However, these 
two groups of candidates are situated quite far away from each other (14 km). 
                                                 
11 Complete results of this tests are available upon request.  
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A distance effect could be reflected in the previously estimated effect of the reputation of the 
large administrative unit and could account for some of the apparent discrimination that we 
discern. Table 4 presents the results concerning the effect of reputation at the level of the large 
administrative unit when taking into account the distance to employment. 
The unequal localization of employment assumed by the spatial mismatch framework is 
confirmed in our dataset, as the job offers registered during the experiment are located in Paris 
more frequently (56.6%) and less often in Seine -Saint- Denis (4.8%). For candidates who 
received at least one positive response, the distance to the average job is 11 km for the group 
of candidates located in Paris versus 21 km for other candidates. This difference is slightly 
offset by a stronger effect of congestion for Paris candidates. According to our calculations, at 
peak times they travel these distances by car at an average speed of 37 km / h versus 41 km / h 
for the candidates of Seine-Saint-Denis. Thus, in 62% of cases commuting time is over 10 
minutes for Parisians, and in only 8% of cases this commuting time is more than 10 minutes for 
the candidates of Seine -Saint- Denis. 
As listed in table 4, the effect of the reputation of large administrative unit is the strongest (-
10.4 percentage points for response rates for the same job offers) when jobs are relatively 
further away from candidates located in Seine-Saint- Denis. This result is expected because it 
combines the spatial mismatch effect and the reputation effect of the region of reference. In 
contrast, when jobs are situated relatively closer to Seine -Saint- Denis, the sign of the 
coefficients becomes slightly positive (but not significant). Employers who are situated 
relatively close to Seine-Saint-Denis do not seem to prefer candidates living in Seine-Saint-
Denis, despite their shorter commutes. This is particularly marked in the case of waiters. This 
result calls into question the general assumption stated in Tilly et al. (2001) that employers still 
have a preference for candidates located closeby irrespective of their location and occupation. 
The candidates' reputation of the place of residence effect plays a role in the choice of employer 
recruitment and might reinforce the spatial mismatch effect. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
4. Econometric Estimates  
In the protocol of our experiment, we do control for the characteristics of job seekers, but we 
do not control for the attributes of job offers made by companies. It is therefore necessary to 
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verify whether the results generated by the descriptive statistics depend on the specific 
characteristics of the job offers. To determine, all other things being equal, the effects of the 
reputation of both the neighbourhood and the large administrative unit on the probability of 
obtaining a positive response, it is possible to use a hierarchical discrete choice model (Bryk 
and Raudenbush, 1992 ; Hox, 2002). Our specification is: 
 
 log (
pij
1-pij
) = β0j+β1jDAU + β2ZUS + β3ZUS*DAU + γXij   (1) 
 
with pij being the probability that the application i to the offer j receives a positive response. 
The exogenous variables are the following.  
 
X: level of education, the position posted (cook or waiters), characteristics of the job offer 
ZUS: dummy variable for being located in a Zone Urbaine Sensible  
DAU: dummy variable for being located in the disadvantaged large administrative unit 
(Seine-Saint-Denis). 
The hierarchical structure of the model allows one to take account of the structure of the data 
generated through the testing procedure and to test the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients 
associated with the effects of the reputation of both the large administrative area and the 
neighbourhood to the characteristics of job offers. The objective is to control for the observable 
influences and to adjust for the unobservable influences associated with job offers to which 
résumés were sent. The form of the hierarchical model allows for parameters that are specified 
as follows: 
For the intercept: 𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑗                     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ       𝑢0𝑗  ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢0
2 )                        (2) 
For the coefficient of DAU : 
 𝛽1𝑗 = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑘
3
𝑘=1 + 𝑢1𝑗     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ       𝑢1𝑗  ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢1
2 )                                 (3) 
The parameter 𝜷𝟏𝒋 is a linear combination of the average effect for each offer expressed by 
the coefficients 𝛼𝑘, which are fixed effects related to the location of offers, plus a random 
disturbance term 𝒖𝟏𝒋. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑘 with k=1,...,3 denotes a set of dummy time variables. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒1 is 
equal to one if the commuting time gap between our Paris Neighourhoods and those of Seine-
Saint-Denis is at least of 5 minutes shorter for the Seine-Saint-Denis neighourhoods. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒2 is 
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equal to one when this commuting time gap is lower than 5 minutes. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒3 is equal to one if 
the commuting time gap is at least of 5 minutes shorter for the Paris neighourhoods. 12  
Model 1 corresponds to the case where only 𝜷𝟎𝒋 varies according to the offers, and thus 
𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 𝜎𝑢1
2 = 0. This model is identical to a logit model with random effects. The 
estimating sample contains all 2,988 observations for which an indicator is observed for each 
qualitative variable regarding both the candidates and the job offers. We note the intra-class 
correlation is strong because more than 80% of the total variance is explained by the hierarchical 
structure of the data. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
The results confirm a very marked effect for the large administrative unit and a strong 
neighbourhood reputation effect, albeit of lower magnitude. Table 6 presents the marginal 
effects that are obtained from these results. 13 The negative effect for DAU (Seine-Saint-Denis) 
is 4.26 points, and the effect of the disadvantaged neighbourhood in Paris is 2.59 percentage 
points. These effects are lower than those reported in table 2 but remain high in absolute terms 
and are close in magnitude to the effect of having a medium-skilled diploma.  
The interacted effect of the large administrative unit and the neighbourhood is of the opposite 
sign, which means that a disadvantaged neighbourhood is less detrimental when one lives in a 
department that is already disadvantaged. We observe that the penalty associated with hiring 
people from disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Seine-Saint-Denis is not significant. Note that 
these estimates take into account firm characteristics. Contrary to the results published in 
Neumark et al. (1996), we do not observe differences among employers according to their type 
of restaurant.  
Model 2 estimates several area effects taking into account potential spatial mismatch effects. 
We no longer impose the restriction that 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3. Several tests were performed, and only 
the coefficient 𝛽1𝑗 changes significantly depending on the location of the job offers. We note 
that the large administrative unit reputation effect is offset by the distance effect when offers 
                                                 
12 We compute several thresholds but our conclusions remain the same. 
13 The average marginal effect has been computed by using the formula for discrete variables (Greene, 2002). 
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are situated to Seine-Saint-Denis (the estimated coefficient of DAU  TIME1). But the reputation 
effect has a significant influence on the propensity of being granted to an interview when jobs 
are situated close to the Parisian candidates or equidistant from Paris and Seine-Saint-Denis. A 
hypothesis test shows that the gap is not statistically significant. One can note that marginal 
effects derived from model 2 are close to those obtained from the model 1, except for the 
diploma effect, which is weaker.  
Finally, Model 3 estimates equations (1) to (3) without any constraints. It improves the 
Akaike's information criteria (revealed in the lower AIC) and can be interpreted as being a 
tighter fit. In regards to lower the cross effect of the large administrative unit reputation and the 
commuting time gap, we obtain the following relationship:  
𝛽1?̂? =
−1.095
(0,685)𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒1 +
−2.165
(0,618)𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒2 +
−2,492
(0,380)𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒3 + 𝜇𝑘?̂? 
with 𝜇𝑘?̂?~𝑁(0, 4.34
2)  
The negative effect of the bad reputation for the large administrative unit is distributed 
normally with mean - 2.492 and variance 4.342 for job offers situated closer to the Paris area. 
The average of this effect is only−2.165 for job offers located almost at the same distance from 
Paris and the Seine-Saint-Denis area with the same underlying variance. The average of this 
effect is not significant for jobs located closer to the Seine-Saint-Denis area.  
Insert Table 6 here 
The marginal effects associated with model 3 are in the same order than those derived from 
models 1 and 2. The principle difference is that the effect of the ZUS for Paris is weaker. We 
notice that the effect of living in a large administrative unit reinforces the spatial mismatch 
effect (as reported in Mouw, 2002 for racial stigma).  
As an implication of our results, it appears that unemployed workers have a strong direct 
incentive to change their place of residence, both the neighbourhood as well as the department 
(Oreopoulos, 2003). This will necessitate paying a higher rent. Using the Insee House Survey, 
we found that rent gap between a ZUS or an attractive dwelling in the 18ème arrondissement 
for a 50 m2 flat is approximately of 10,700 euros per year. Therefore, the effect of changing 
one’s place of residence on the chance of getting a job is -2.83 percentage points for a job 
paying 20,400 euros on average per year. The expected salary gain is 580 euros per year. One 
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can conclude that on the net basis, there is no incentive for discriminated peoples to change 
place of residence.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have showed that the reputation of the place of residence can strongly influence the 
probability of obtaining a job for waiters and cooks in the metropolitan Paris region. It plays an 
active role in the determinants of an individual’s returns from working through the behaviour 
of employers, who appear to use the address as screening criterion. 
To explain the effect specific to the place of residence, we evoke sources of statistical 
discrimination, that is to say discrimination based not on preferences per se but rather on 
information available to the employer. In the absence of perfect information about the 
productivity of job applicants, employers attribute to these individual candidates what they 
perceive to be the average characteristics of populations represented particularly in these 
neighbourhoods, i.e. French immigrants with low incomes and unstable employment patterns. 
Based on these perceptions, the place of residence could be perceived as a signal of lower 
professional reliability or of an undiversified social network. 
Therefore, reputation of place of residence operates through complex channels. It is not 
simply additive with respect to the effect of departmental reputation. Moreover, because 
residents of disadvantaged areas with poor reputations are not that mobile, they cannot easily 
move in order to avoid these reputational effects. This behavioural mechanism might serve to 
weaken upward mobility of these workers.    
These conclusions are based on a field experiment carried out in 2011 in the Paris area for the 
occupations of waiters and cooks. They are not necessarily applicable to other locations, other 
time periods, and other professions or occupations. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics pertaining to the place of residence of the fictitious candidates 
  
Population 
Share of 
foreigners 
Median 
household 
income in 
Euros in 2009 
Unemployment 
rate in 2009 
Share of the 
population living 
in a ZUS (number 
of ZUS) 
Share of 
individuals with 
some post 
secondary 
education 
Paris (city and departement) 2,234,100 14.9% €25,040 11.0% 6% (9) 54.0% 
The 18th district of Paris 200,630 19.0% €18,400 13.1% 17% (3) 45.7% 
 Neighbourhood of 
Place du Tertre* 
1,935 17.5% €25,400 11.7% 0% (0) 57.1% 
 Neighbourhood of 
Championnet* 
2,225 18.8% €14,565 12.4% 0%(0) 48.9% 
 ZUS of the 18th 
district 
23,190 32.7% €13,700 20.1% 100% (1) 41.7% 
Seine-Saint-Denis 1,515,980 21.2% €15,080 16.5% 21% (36) 21.0% 
 Le Raincy 13,780 5.4% €26,630 9.3% 0% (0) 39.0% 
Bondy 53,450 32.5% €14,110 17.7% 29% (2) 18.6% 
 Neighbourhood of 
Violettes* 
2,558 19.1% €15,923 16.3% 0%(0) 21.4% 
 ZUS of Bondy 15,595 24.0% €13,200 23.1% 100% (1) 13.2% 
ZUS: Zone Urbaine Sensible (see note 1); *: This statistics are calculated at the Infra-communal census zone (IRIS).level. 
Source: French Census and Fiscal Database of INSEE. 
 
 
Map 1. Location of the deprived, intermediate and advantaged neighbourhoods 
 
Red: deprived neighbourhoods; Green: Intermediate neighbourhoods; Violet: advantaged neighbourhoods 
The others Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS) of Seine-Saint-Denis and Paris are in blue (not part of our sample).  
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Table 2 
Gross rate of success and differences in success rates for the same job offers  
 
Level 
Standard 
deviation 
90% confidence interval 
 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Joint effect of the disadvantaged large administrative area and disadvantaged neighbourhood 
Gross rate of success 
Disadvantaged neighbourhood in Seine-Saint-Denis 
(N=498) 17.1% 0.017 14.3% 19.8% 
Advantaged neighbourhood in Paris (N=498) 26.5% 0.020 23.3% 29.7% 
Differences in success rates for the same job offers- 
% points -9.4*** 1.93 -12.54 -6.33 
Effect of the disadvantaged large administrative area 
Gross rate of success 
Seine-Saint-Denis (N=1,494) 16.7% 0.010 15.1% 18.3% 
Paris (N=1,494) 24.4% 0.011 22.5% 26.2% 
Differences in success rates for the same job offers- 
% points -7.7*** 1.342 -9.89 -5.52 
Effect of disadvantaged neighbourhood (overall) 
Gross rate of success 
Disadvantaged neighbourhood (N=996) 19.2% 0.013 17.1% 21.2% 
Advantaged neighbourhood (N=996) 22.0% 0.013 19.9% 24.2% 
Differences in success rates for the same job offers- 
% points -2.8*** 1.102 -4.57 -1.06 
Effect of disadvantaged neighbourhood (Paris only) 
Gross rate of success 
Disadvantaged neighbourhood (N=498) 21,3% 0,018 18,3% 24,3% 
Advantaged neighbourhood (N=498) 26,5% 0,019 23,3% 29,7% 
Differences in success rates for the same job offers- 
% points -5,3*** 1.751 -8,0 -2,5 
Effect of the disadvantaged municipality (within Seine-Saint-Denis) 
Gross rate of success 
Disadvantaged municipality (Bondy) ) (N=996) 16.3% 0.012 14.3% 18.2% 
Advantaged municipality (Le Raincy) (N=498) 17.5% 0.017 14.7% 20.2% 
Differences in success rates for the same job offers- 
% points -1.21 1.287 -3.21 0.80 
N: number of observations; Standard deviation and confidence intervals were calculated using the clustering-
bootstrapping method based on 10,000 draws.*** significant at the 1% level 
Source: Data generated through testing experiment, with 2,988 observations. 
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Table 3 
Differences in response rates for the same job offers 
Breakdowns according to skill level and occupation 
pairwise comparisons for the 
same job offers 
Gap 
(in % points) 
Standard 
deviation 
Gap 
(in % points) 
Standard 
deviation 
Joint effect of disadvantaged large administrative area and disadvantaged neighbourhood 
 Cooks  Waiters  
Low-skilled -6.6* 3.385 -10.3*** 2.725 
Medium-skilled -7.8* 4.216 -14.7*** 5.611 
Effect of disadvantaged large administrative area   
 Cooks  Waiters  
Low-skilled -1.7 2.272 -8.7*** 2.273 
Medium-skilled -8.9*** 2.984 -13.4*** 3.451 
Effect of disadvantaged neighbourhood    
 Cooks  Waiters  
Low-skilled     
Paris -5.8* 3.074 -4.5** -2.108 
Seine-Saint-Denis -2.9 2.513 0.01 1.000 
Medium-skilled     
Paris -3.5 3.653 -8 5.320 
Seine-Saint-Denis 1.75 3.431 0.00 0.003 
Standard Deviation were calculated using the clustering-bootstrapping method based on 10, 000 draws. 
In our testing experiment we have 822 Low-skilled cooks, 936 Low-skilled waiters, 696 medium-skilled cooks and 524 
medium-skilled waiters.  
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and* at the 10% level 
Source: Data generated through testing experiment, with 2,988 observations. 
 
Table 4 
Differences in response rates for the disadvantaged large administrative area according to the 
commuting time between the place of residence and the workplace (gap in % points) 
Gap in commuting time 
Commute of Paris-based 
candidates at least 5 minutes 
longer (N=342) 
No large gap in 
commuting times 
(N=324) 
Commute of Paris-
based candidates at 
least 5 minutes shorter 
(N = 2,322) 
ALL 
0.5 
(2.917) 
-5.4** 
(2.507) 
-10.4*** 
(1.783) 
Cooks  
   
Low-skilled 
1.5 
(7.310) 
-5.0 
 (6.095) 
-1.8 
(2.511) 
Medium-skilled 
2.0 
(6.043) 
-3.3 
(8.612) 
-11.6*** 
(3.529) 
Waiters 
   
Low-skilled 
-8.4 
(5.801) 
-7.1 
(7.886) 
-9.1*** 
(2.514) 
Medium-skilled 
-6.6 
(11.195) no obs 
-16.0*** 
(3.744) 
Standard deviation are in parenthesis. They were calculated using the clustering-bootstrapping method based on 10, 000 
draws. 
In our testing experiment we have 822 Low-skilled cooks, 936 Low-skilled waiters, 696 medium-skilled cooks and 524 
medium-skilled waiters.  
Source: Data generated through testing experiment, with 2,988 observations 
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Table 5 
Estimates of the probability of receiving a positive response 
Results from hierarchal discrete choice model 
  
Model 1 
  
Model 2 
  
Model 3 
  
Location of the offer Coef. std. err Coef. std. err Coef. std. err 
Located in Seine St Denis 
(DAU) 
-
1.395*** 0.183     
DAUTIME1   -0.423 0.376 -1.095 0,685 
DAUTIME2   -1.300*** 0.341 -2.165*** 0,618 
DAUTIME3   -1.662*** 0.217 -2,492*** 0,380 
Located in a Zone Urbaine 
Sensible (ZUS) 
-
0.642*** 0.208 -0.656*** 0.211 -0,749*** 0,227 
ZUSDAU 0.742** 0.306 0.756*** 0.308 0,882** 0,344 
Characteristics of the 
individual         
Medium-skilled certification  1.147** 0.491 1.224*** 0.502 1,415** 0,565 
Offer for a cook (ref. waiter) 1.019** 0.450 0.979** 0.462 1,009* 0,521 
Characteristics of the offer 
and the enterprise          
Restaurants located in Paris 
(Paris) 1.005** 0.455 1.189*** 0.478 1,396*** 0,540 
Offer found in Pôle Emploi 0.933* 0.519 0.956* 0.532 1,020 0,602 
Constant 
-
4.966*** 0,832 
-
4.786*** 0.837 -5,572*** 0,956 
Sigma u0 3.699*** 0,287 3.775*** 0.296 2,610*** 0,362 
Sigma u1       4,335*** 0,346 
Intra-class correlation 80.6%  81.3%  67.5%  
Pseudo-R2 4.86%   5.17%  7.42%  
Log-likelihood  -989.2   -985.9  -960.0  
Akaike Information criterion  2,018.3  2,015.9  1,966.0  
Time1 is equal to one if the commuting time gap between our Paris neighourhood and those of Seine-Saint-Denis is at least of 5 minutes 
in favour of Seine-Saint-Denis neighourhoods.  
Time2 is equal to one when this commuting time gap is shorter than 5 minutes.  
Time3 is equal to one if the commuting time is at least of 5 minutes in favour of Paris neighourhoods. 
 DAU: disadvantaged large administrative unit 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and* at the 10% level 
Source: Data generated through the testing experiment, with 2,988 observations. 
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Table 6 
Determination of marginal effects associated with commuting time 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Located in Seine St Denis (DAU) 
-5.50*** 
[-7.69 ; -3.40]   
TIME1  
-2.08 
[-5.29 ; +2.31] 
-4.03** 
[-6.79 ; -1.72] 
 TIME2  
-5.05*** 
[-7.77 ; -2.77] 
-5.16*** 
[-7.94 ; -2.79] 
 TIME3  
-5.82*** 
[-8.13 ; -3.62] 
-5.32*** 
[-8.17 ; -2.92] 
Located in the ZUS in Seine-St-Denis 
(DAU) 
-5.18*** 
[-7.39 ; -3.15]   
 TIME1  
-1.20 
[-4.90 ; +4.19] 
-3.65** 
[-6.51 ; -1.10] 
 TIME2  
-4.66 
[-7.42 ; -2.16] 
-5.04*** 
[-6.51 ; -2.74] 
 TIME3  
-5.56*** 
[-7.89 ; -3.38] 
-5.25*** 
[-8.08 ; -2.89] 
Located in the ZUS in Paris 
-3.27*** 
[-5.07 ; -1.59] 
-3.25*** 
[-5.05 ; -1.55] 
-2.83*** 
[-4.72 ; -1.25] 
Medium-skilled certification  
+4.99*** 
[+2.07;+8.37] 
+4.83*** 
[+2.03 ; +8.47] 
+3.50*** 
[+1.27 ; +6.51] 
Time1 is equal to one if the commuting time gap between our Paris neighourhood and those of Seine-Saint-Denis is at least of 5 
minutes in favour of Seine-Saint-Denis neighourhoods.  
Time2 is equal to one when this commuting time gap is shorter than 5 minutes.  
Time3 is equal to one if the commuting time is at least of 5 minutes in favour of Paris neighourhoods. 
  The 90% confidence intervals in square brackets are obtained via the clustering-bootstrapping technique using 10,000 draws 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and* at the 10% level 
Source: Data generated through testing experiment, with 2,988 observations. 
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